Connectivity system
Connectivity system qualification evidence support
This support prepares a connectivity system's qualification evidence for a qualification review, where the article's security, architecture, and environmental results are weighed against its specification and assumed integration context. A supplier owning the system runs it when the DO-326A security outcomes, the architecture verification, and the environmental results all have to agree with the article configuration before the review opens. The work reads the qualification data, marks each requirement with no demonstrated result behind it, and stages the gaps for closure. You receive a qualification-focused gap list, a specification-to-result trace, and an order for clearing what remains open.
When this review is needed
- A qualification review is booked and the supplier wants the security and environmental results checked against the specification and the article first.
- The DO-326A security requirements were derived and it is unclear which have a demonstrated verification behind them.
- The architecture changed during the campaign and earlier verification may reflect a superseded segregation design.
- The environmental results have to be tied to the article build the system will actually ship as.
The problem
Connectivity qualification carries a security dimension that most articles do not, and it moves independently of the hardware. DO-326A produces a set of derived security requirements, and each one needs a demonstrated verification or a substantiated rationale for why it is closed. Those requirements are refined as the threat picture and the architecture mature, so the set that has to be satisfied at review is not the set that was captured at the start. Meanwhile the architecture verification and the DO-160G results attach to specific builds. By review, the supplier holds security requirements, architecture evidence, and environmental results that were each captured against a different snapshot of the design.
What gets reviewed
- DO-326A derived security requirements against their demonstrated verifications or substantiated closures
- Architecture and segregation verification against the current design definition
- DO-160G environmental results against the categories the certification basis assigns
- Article-configuration mapping so each result is tied to the build it was demonstrated on
- The compliance matrix mapping each requirement, including security requirements, to a named result
- Traceability from each requirement to the verification and build that satisfies it
Scope this review
Tell us the asset, the event, and the evidence in scope, and we will outline a focused first engagement.
Identify what is missing against the means of compliance.
What gets validated
- Each DO-326A security requirement has a demonstrated verification or a substantiated closure rationale
- Architecture and segregation verification reflects the current design, not a superseded snapshot
- Every DO-160G category the basis assigns has a passing result at the current article build
- Each qualification result names the build it represents and that build maps to the shippable article
- No security or architecture requirement is left recorded without evidence behind it
Evidence normally required
- The system specification, the certification basis, and the means-of-compliance statement
- The DO-326A derived security requirements and their verification records
- Architecture and segregation verification evidence and the current design definition
- DO-160G environmental qualification reports and the article build history
- The current qualification compliance matrix
Common discrepancies
- A derived security requirement with no demonstrated verification and no substantiated closure rationale
- Architecture verification run against a segregation design later revised in the current build
- A DO-160G result at a superseded build with no rerun for the shippable article
- A security requirement present in the matrix but never mapped to a result
What is at stake
A derived security requirement recorded without a demonstrated verification, or an architecture verification run against a superseded segregation design, reads as covered until someone checks the requirement against its evidence and the evidence against the current build. Found in the review, either leaves the system short on a security or architecture requirement the authority will not waive, and security or architecture rework is coupled tightly enough to disturb the environmental picture as well.
How the work runs
Freeze the requirement set
Fix the current DO-326A security requirements, architecture definition, and certification basis as the criteria to satisfy.
Match requirement to evidence
Confirm each security and architecture requirement has a verification or a substantiated closure behind it.
Map result to build
Tie each environmental and architecture result to the build it represents and compare to the shippable article.
Sequence the closure
Order open items so coupled security and architecture work clears in the right order, and deliver the plan.
What the buyer receives
- A qualification-focused gap list ordered by which open requirement blocks the review
- A trace map from each requirement, including security requirements, to its verification and build
- A closure sequence that keeps coupled security and architecture rework in order
Who uses the output
- Certification engineers assembling the connectivity system qualification data package
- Security engineers reconciling derived requirements to their verifications
- Program leads managing the coupling between security, architecture, and environmental closure
How the work fits into the transaction or program
This review follows the qualification campaign and precedes its review. It settles whether every derived security requirement carries evidence, whether the architecture verification reflects the current design, and whether each result belongs to the shippable build, so the review evaluates one coherent argument instead of three workstreams captured against different design snapshots.
Start with a single asset
Confirm requirements map to substantiating evidence.
Jurisdiction-specific considerations
For a system qualified toward both FAA and EASA acceptance, the two can expect the DO-326A argument documented or referenced differently, and a single evidence set must satisfy the stricter reading of each. The review marks any security or architecture result that clears one authority's expectation and leaves the other with a shortfall.
Regulatory limits
This work assesses readiness of the supplier's qualification evidence, including the security argument. It renders no airworthiness or security finding, grants no authorization, and does not act for the authority. Compliance is found only by the reviewing authority against the submitted data.
What this review does not cover
Specific to this review
- DO-326A derived security requirements refine as the threat picture matures, so the set to satisfy at review differs from the set first captured.
- Each security requirement needs a demonstrated verification or a substantiated closure, not merely a statement that it was addressed.
- Architecture verification pins to a segregation snapshot, so a mid-campaign redesign can leave earlier verification describing a design that no longer ships.
- Security, architecture, and environmental evidence attach to different design snapshots, which is why aligning them all to the shippable build is the core of the review.
Sources
U.S. Government (eCFR). Type certificates, STCs (Subpart E), TSO authorizations (Subpart O), PMA (Subpart K), and export airworthiness approvals (Subpart L).
European Union / EASA. EASA design and production certification, STCs, ETSO authorizations, and EASA Form 1 release.
RTCA. Environmental qualification test categories and procedures referenced by TSO and equipment qualification.
SAE International. Development assurance process at aircraft and system level, including requirements capture and validation.
Frequently asked questions
What counts as adequate evidence for a derived security requirement at qualification review?
Each derived security requirement needs either a demonstrated verification result or a substantiated rationale explaining why it is closed. A requirement that is merely listed as addressed, with nothing behind it, is treated as an open gap, so the review checks every security requirement for a verification or a documented closure argument.
Relevant glossary terms
Related pages
Where this fits
Talk to an engineer who has done this work
We will walk through your current state, the records or evidence involved, and a scoped first engagement.
Talk through the aircraft, records, evidence, deadline, and next useful step.