TSO evidence
TCAS II / ACAS II TSO-C119e for DO-185B collision-logic evidence
This review supports avionics suppliers, equipment suppliers, OEMs during Surveillance TSO authorization planning. EE reads DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification, hybrid-surveillance test data, DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic against configuration records, approval assumptions, and the cited source material. The buyer receives a concise package showing what is proven, what is inconsistent, and what should be resolved before submittal, installation, import, or purchase.
What gets reviewed
- Trace DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification against the claim it supports.
- Challenge hybrid-surveillance test data against the claim it supports.
- Reconcile DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic against the claim it supports.
- Confirm coordination-with-transponder interface data against the claim it supports.
- Index DO-160G environmental categories against the claim it supports.
- Compare approval basis against the claim it supports.
Scope this review
Tell us the asset, the event, and the evidence in scope, and we will outline a focused first engagement.
Identify what is missing against the means of compliance.
What gets validated
- Limit carryover: DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification fails review if the cited record cannot be tied to the current baseline.
- Source control: hybrid-surveillance test data fails review if the cited record cannot be tied to the current baseline.
- Closure owner: DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic fails review if the cited record cannot be tied to the current baseline.
- Configuration match: coordination-with-transponder interface data fails review if the cited record cannot be tied to the current baseline.
- The review notes that evidence link: DO-160G environmental categories fails review if the cited record cannot be tied to the current baseline.
Evidence normally required
- Analysis note: DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification
- Manual source: hybrid-surveillance test data
- Configuration item: DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic
- Closure evidence: coordination-with-transponder interface data
- Baseline record: DO-160G environmental categories
- Test file: approval basis
Common discrepancies
- Buyer concern: logic version 7.0 residual behaviour where 7.1 is required.
- Program risk: hybrid surveillance credited without the supporting track-quality evidence.
- Authority question: RA/HMI alerting not substantiated against the human-factors expectations.
- Finding in records: baseline does not match the delivered records.
How the work runs
Frame Tcas Acas
Confirm the exact event, affected file set, buyer role, and decision standard before any do-185b mops and logic-version verification is treated as sufficient.
Trace C119e Evidence
Walk the named evidence from index entry to source artifact and mark where the trail supports, conflicts with, or fails to answer the page-specific question.
Sort 185b Collision
Group exceptions by closure route: document retrieval, data correction, engineering disposition, authority response, or contractual decision.
Package Explain Hybrid
Deliver the exception list, evidence map, and owner sequence in a form that can move directly into remediation, submittal cleanup, or transaction negotiation.
What the buyer receives
Who uses the output
- Certification engineers use the map to brief the decision.
- avionics engineers use the register to assign closure.
- safety engineers use the request list to collect source records.
How the work fits into the transaction or program
This work sits inside the surrounding records or certification workflow and turns loose evidence questions into an ordered closure file. The page-specific framing is what a TCAS II / ACAS II unit must substantiate for TSO-C119e, distinct from the transponder and surveillance pages because the decisive artifact is DO-185B collision-avoidance logic (version 7.1) behaviour, hybrid-surveillance performance, and the resolution-advisory alerting shown safe at the flight deck. The review notes that evidence reviewed: DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification, hybrid-surveillance test data, DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic, coordination-with-transponder interface. For tcas acas tso c119e, the practical output is a defensible record of what was checked, what did not match, who owns the fix, and which issue remains outside the review boundary. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence scope is intentionally narrow: Explain the DO-185B logic and hybrid-surveillance evidence a TCAS II unit needs for TSO-C119e.. The Tcas Acas Tso evidence question is tested against do-185b mops and logic-version verification and not against a generic checklist copied from another page. The C119e Evidence Certification trigger is surveillance tso authorization planning, so the review ranks gaps by decision impact instead of document volume. The 185b Collision Logic searcher pattern is A surveillance supplier searches for TCAS II / ACAS II TSO-C119e / DO-185B requirements when scoping an authorization or upgrade.. The Handoff Matrix Package evidence trail has to show source location, current status, conflicting entries, and the owner who can close the issue. The Evidence Record Review exception logic separates missing artifacts from mismatched data because those findings move through different closure routes. The Closure Trace Baseline handoff is written for certification engineer, with unresolved items preserved as decisions rather than softened into narrative prose. The deliverable stays anchored on evidence map for tcas ii acas ii tso c119e, which makes the next reviewer able to reperform the path without rebuilding the file. The boundary is deliberately explicit: records and certification evidence are organized, but approval, acceptance, and airworthiness decisions remain with the authorized parties. The brief-specific angle is what a TCAS II / ACAS II unit must substantiate for TSO-C119e, distinct from the transponder and surveillance pages because the decisive artifact is DO-185B collision-avoidance logic (version 7.1) behaviour, hybrid-surveillance performance, and the resolution-advisory alerting shown safe at the flight deck. The review notes that evidence reviewed: DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification, hybrid-surveillance test data, DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic, coordination-with-transponder interface data, and DO-160G environmental categories. The failure pattern includes logic version 7.0 residual behaviour where 7.1 is required, hybrid surveillance credited without the supporting track-quality evidence, and RA/HMI alerting not substantiated against the human-factors expectations. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence tcas acas tso lane records how 185b collision logic affects must substantiate distinct, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence tso c119e certification lane records how logic decision unit affects distinct transponder surveillance, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence certification 185b collision lane records how unit must substantiate affects surveillance pages because, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence collision logic decision lane records how substantiate distinct transponder affects because decisive artifact, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence decision unit must lane records how transponder surveillance pages affects artifact avoidance version, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence must substantiate distinct lane records how pages because decisive affects version behaviour hybrid, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence distinct transponder surveillance lane records how decisive artifact avoidance affects hybrid performance resolution, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence surveillance pages because lane records how avoidance version behaviour affects resolution advisory alerting, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence because decisive artifact lane records how behaviour hybrid performance affects alerting shown safe, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence artifact avoidance version lane records how performance resolution advisory affects safe flight, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence version behaviour hybrid lane records how advisory alerting shown affects tcas acas tso, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence hybrid performance resolution lane records how shown safe flight affects tso c119e certification, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence resolution advisory alerting lane records how flight affects certification 185b collision, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence alerting shown safe lane records how acas tso c119e affects collision logic decision, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence safe flight lane records how c119e certification 185b affects decision unit must, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence tcas acas tso lane records how 185b collision logic affects must substantiate distinct, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence tso c119e certification lane records how logic decision unit affects distinct transponder surveillance, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The tcas ii acas ii tso c119e evidence certification 185b collision lane records how unit must substantiate affects surveillance pages because, so this page carries vocabulary and failure modes that do not repeat the neighboring page set. The governing intent remains Explain the DO-185B logic and hybrid-surveillance evidence a TCAS II unit needs for TSO-C119e.. The operating angle for this page is Decision: what a TCAS II / ACAS II unit must substantiate for TSO-C119e, distinct from the transponder and surveillance pages because the decisive artifact is DO-185B collision-avoidance logic (version 7.1) behaviour, hybrid-surveillance performance, and the resolution-advisory alerting shown safe at the flight deck. The review notes that evidence reviewed: DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification, hybrid-surveillance test data, DO-178C software data at the assigned level for the RA logic, coordination-with-transponder interface data, and DO-160G environmental categories. Failure modes: logic version 7.0 residual behaviour where 7.1 is required, hybrid surveillance credited without the supporting track-quality evidence, and RA/HMI alerting not substantiated against the human-factors.
Start with a single asset
Reduce finding cycles by checking the package first.
Regulatory limits
EE does not certify equipment, approve installations, or declare an aircraft compliant. The output identifies supportable claims, missing records, and questions that need applicant or authority disposition.
Specific to this review
- what a TCAS II / ACAS II unit must substantiate for TSO-C119e, distinct from the transponder and surveillance pages because the decisive artifact is DO-185B collision-avoidance logic (version 7.1) behaviour, hybrid-surveillance performance, and the resolution-advisory alerting shown safe at the flight deck.
- DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification often controls whether later summaries can be trusted.
- Logic version 7.0 residual behaviour where 7.1 is required is treated as a record gap until an owner closes it.
- FAA and EASA evidence should stay distinguishable from commercial claims and installer notes.
- The scope uses the Tcas Acas TSO C119e question as the control point, so the review stays tied to Surveillance TSO authorization planning and the buyer decision behind it.
- The evidence starts with DO-185B MOPS and logic-version verification and follows Evidence Certification 185b Collision references until every exception has a source location and a reason code.
- The finding logic separates missing paperwork, conflicting status, stale revision data, and unsupported disposition because each class closes through a different owner.
- The timing matters for Certification engineer: the output is useful only if the unresolved items are visible before acceptance, submittal, handback, or negotiation pressure fixes the sequence.
- The boundary control keeps Logic Explain Hybrid Surveillance questions in the records or certification lane and sends technical acceptance issues to the authorized people who own them.
- The handoff value comes from Evidence map for TCAS Ii ACAS Ii TSO C119e; it gives the next reviewer a precise map instead of another broad request for a better file.
Sources
U.S. Government (eCFR). Type certificates, STCs (Subpart E), TSO authorizations (Subpart O), PMA (Subpart K), and export airworthiness approvals (Subpart L).
RTCA. Objectives and lifecycle data for airborne software assurance, by design assurance level (DAL A-E).
SAE International. Safety assessment methods (FHA, PSSA, SSA, FTA, FMEA) supporting development assurance level assignment.
Frequently asked questions
What makes this product-types review different from a general file audit?
The scope is tied to tcas acas tso c119e and to the decision named in the request. A general audit can list weak records; this pass ranks the gaps by whether they block surveillance tso authorization planning or can be closed later without changing the decision.
What evidence has to be available before this work starts?
The starting point is do-185b mops and logic-version verification, the current status source, and any index or matrix that tells reviewers where the supporting artifact should live. Missing inputs are logged as findings rather than filled with assumptions.
Who decides whether an open item is acceptable?
The review explains what the evidence supports and gives certification engineer a closure path. Acceptance remains with the buyer, operator, authority, delegated engineer, or authorized person responsible for the underlying airworthiness or certification decision.
Relevant glossary terms
Related pages
Where this fits
Talk to an engineer who has done this work
We will walk through your current state, the records or evidence involved, and a scoped first engagement.
Talk through the aircraft, records, evidence, deadline, and next useful step.