Instructions for continued airworthiness
Instructions for continued airworthiness support for a major change
This review checks that the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness for a major change describe the configuration that was actually approved, not an earlier design state. A certification engineer runs it before the ICA are finalized in the data package. It confirms that maintenance tasks, airworthiness limitations, and parts data match the approved change and its effectivity, and that nothing the safety assessment relied on is missing from the maintenance instructions. You receive a gap assessment, an evidence map linking each ICA element to the approved configuration, and a closure plan for the instructions that lag the design.
When this review is needed
- The ICA are drafted but the design moved after they were written and no one has reconciled them.
- The safety assessment credited a maintenance task and it has to appear as an airworthiness limitation in the ICA.
- New or changed parts came out of the change and the ICA parts data has not caught up.
- A reviewer will check that the maintenance instructions cover the configuration the change actually approved.
The problem
ICA are usually written while the design is still moving, so they describe the configuration as it was at draft, not as approved. A maintenance task credited in the safety assessment can be absent from the airworthiness limitations, a part introduced by the change can be missing from the parts data, and an inspection interval can lag a late design decision. The instructions are the last thing to catch up to the airframe, and the gap is easy to miss because the ICA read complete on their own.
What gets reviewed
- Maintenance tasks in the ICA reconciled to the approved configuration and its effectivity
- Airworthiness limitations matched to the tasks the safety assessment credited
- Parts data covering the parts the change introduced or altered
- Inspection intervals and thresholds consistent with the approved design
- ICA structure and referencing consistent with the operator's existing maintenance data
- Continued-airworthiness coverage mapped against the certification basis for the change
Scope this review
Tell us the asset, the event, and the evidence in scope, and we will outline a focused first engagement.
Identify what is missing against the means of compliance.
What gets validated
- Every maintenance task the safety assessment credited appears in the ICA with the correct interval
- Airworthiness limitations in the ICA trace to the analysis that established them
- Parts data covers each part the change introduced, changed, or made obsolete
- Inspection thresholds in the ICA match the approved configuration rather than a superseded state
- Effectivity in the ICA matches the effectivity of the approved change
Evidence normally required
- The draft Instructions for Continued Airworthiness for the change
- The safety assessment showing credited maintenance tasks and limitations
- The approved configuration and effectivity for the change
- Parts data and illustrated parts information for the affected items
- The certification basis and any applicable maintenance data standard
Common discrepancies
- A maintenance task credited in the safety assessment that never made it into the ICA
- An airworthiness limitation with an interval that lags a late design decision
- A part introduced by the change that is missing from the ICA parts data
- ICA effectivity that does not match the effectivity of the approved change
What is at stake
ICA that do not cover the approved configuration leave the operator without the maintenance the safety case assumed, which is exactly the kind of gap a reviewer stops on. If a limitation the safety assessment relied on is missing, the finding cannot close until the ICA are corrected, and reconciling them under review pressure is slower than confirming coverage while the design data is fresh in hand.
How the work runs
Pull the approved configuration
Establish the configuration and effectivity the change actually approved as the reference for the ICA.
Reconcile tasks and limitations
Confirm every task and limitation the safety assessment credited appears in the ICA correctly.
Check parts and intervals
Confirm parts data and inspection intervals match the approved design rather than a superseded state.
Plan the closure
Sequence the corrections so the ICA cover the approved configuration before the finding closes.
What the buyer receives
- A gap assessment listing each ICA element that lags the approved configuration
- An evidence map linking each maintenance task and limitation to the approved design
- A closure plan for the instructions that must be corrected before the finding closes
Who uses the output
- Certification engineers confirming the ICA cover what the change approved
- Maintenance engineering leads reconciling tasks and limitations against the safety case
- Compliance managers tracking which ICA gaps still block the finding
How the work fits into the transaction or program
The review sits at the point where the design settles and the maintenance data has to catch up, confirming the ICA describe the approved configuration before the finding closes. It draws on the safety assessment for the tasks that must appear and feeds the finding register with any instruction still lagging the design.
Start with a single asset
Reduce finding cycles by checking the package first.
Jurisdiction-specific considerations
The FAA and EASA both require ICA for a major change, but the format expectations, the way airworthiness limitations are segregated, and the acceptance route can differ between them. The review notes where the same instructions need to be structured or referenced differently to satisfy each authority's finding.
Regulatory limits
The review confirms the ICA cover the approved configuration and the tasks the safety case relied on. It does not author the ICA on the program's behalf, approve the airworthiness limitations, or make any airworthiness determination.
What this review does not cover
- Writing the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness from scratch
- Approving airworthiness limitations on the authority's behalf
- Any airworthiness determination on the modified aircraft
Specific to this review
- ICA are usually the last document to catch up to a change, so they most often describe the configuration as drafted rather than as approved.
- A maintenance task the safety assessment credited but the ICA omit is a hard stop for the finding, because the safety case assumes an instruction the operator would never receive.
- Airworthiness limitations are the one part of the ICA the operator cannot deviate from, so an interval that lags a late design change carries more consequence than a general task that does.
Sources
U.S. Government (eCFR). Type certificates, STCs (Subpart E), TSO authorizations (Subpart O), PMA (Subpart K), and export airworthiness approvals (Subpart L).
Federal Aviation Administration. FAA type certification process, certification basis establishment, and compliance findings.
European Union / EASA. EASA design and production certification, STCs, ETSO authorizations, and EASA Form 1 release.
Federal Aviation Administration. STC application process, certification basis, and continued airworthiness obligations of an STC holder.
Frequently asked questions
How is this different from just proofreading the ICA?
Proofreading confirms the document is internally consistent. This review confirms the ICA describe the configuration the change approved and include every task the safety assessment relied on, which is a comparison against the approved design and the safety case rather than a check of the document alone.
Relevant glossary terms
Related pages
Where this fits
Talk to an engineer who has done this work
We will walk through your current state, the records or evidence involved, and a scoped first engagement.
Talk through the aircraft, records, evidence, deadline, and next useful step.