Navigation avionics
Navigation equipment certification data support
Navigation equipment certification is the path a supplier follows to authorize a positioning, guidance, or flight-management article and substantiate the accuracy and integrity its function depends on. It is used by avionics teams whose unit computes or distributes a navigation solution that the crew or the autoflight system relies on. The data support covers the certification basis, the accuracy and integrity performance case, the environmental qualification, and the software lifecycle data behind the navigation computation. You receive a gap read against the applicable standards and an evidence set arranged for review.
When this review is needed
- A positioning or flight-management article is heading toward authorization and the integrity and accuracy case has to be built against the basis.
- A unit adds a navigation mode or sensor input and the performance and lifecycle data has to reflect it.
- Integrity or accuracy findings against the article have stalled the program and need reconciling.
- A supplier wants an independent read of the navigation package before the basis is locked.
The problem
Navigation certification turns on integrity, the assurance that a wrong position will be detected, more than on raw accuracy. The integrity argument is the hardest part of the case and the easiest to leave thin. Accuracy gets demonstrated in benign conditions, the failure modes that produce undetected error get a cursory treatment, and the software that fuses the inputs carries a level that does not match the consequence of a misleading output. The gaps stay hidden until a reviewer presses on what happens when an input goes bad.
What gets reviewed
- The certification basis and the article authorization the navigation unit is pursued under
- The accuracy performance case across the unit's navigation modes
- The integrity case covering detection of misleading and erroneous output
- DO-160 environmental qualification scoped to the installed location
- Software lifecycle data matched to the navigation function's failure condition
- Sensor input behavior and how the unit handles a degraded or lost source
Scope this review
Tell us the asset, the event, and the evidence in scope, and we will outline a focused first engagement.
Identify what is missing against the means of compliance.
What gets validated
- Accuracy is shown across the modes and conditions the function claims, not only the benign case
- The integrity argument covers detection of misleading output, with evidence behind it
- DO-160 categories match the bay and platform the unit installs into
- Software lifecycle data matches the level a misleading-navigation hazard assigns
- Degraded and lost-input behavior is specified and verified
Evidence normally required
- The draft or current certification basis for the navigation article
- The accuracy and integrity performance characterization to date
- DO-160 qualification test plans and reports so far
- Software lifecycle data for the navigation computation at its current state
- Open findings or prior authority correspondence if a program is running
Common discrepancies
- An integrity argument that demonstrates accuracy but not detection of bad output
- Accuracy shown only in benign conditions the operational case does not bound
- Software level set below the consequence of a misleading-navigation hazard
- Degraded-input behavior unspecified, so a lost source has no defined response
- Derived navigation requirements absent from the safety assessment
What is at stake
A navigation article with a weak integrity case draws findings that go to the core of the function, not the margins. Reworking the integrity argument late is expensive, the schedule slips into the platform program, and the engineering effort lands where it is hardest to recover.
How the work runs
Set the basis
Confirm the certification basis and the navigation modes the article is authorized to provide.
Bound the accuracy
Check accuracy across the modes and conditions the operational case claims, beyond the benign envelope.
Press the integrity
Walk the integrity argument through misleading and lost-input cases and tie it to the safety assessment.
Close the package
Reconcile the matrix against the accuracy and integrity evidence and deliver a prioritized closure list.
What the buyer receives
- A gap read against the applicable navigation-article authorization and standards
- A reconciled compliance matrix tied to the accuracy and integrity evidence
- A traceability view from navigation requirements through verification
- A prioritized list of the data needed to close the package
Who uses the output
- Certification leads building the navigation submittal
- Navigation and software engineers strengthening the integrity argument
- Safety teams confirming the misleading-output case ties back to the assessment
How the work fits into the transaction or program
The work supports the supplier's navigation program and aims at the integrity argument that usually binds the case. It feeds the safety assessment with the derived requirements the computation produces, and it sits alongside a sensor read when the unit depends on inputs it does not own.
Start with a single asset
Confirm requirements map to substantiating evidence.
Aircraft-specific considerations
A flight-management unit on a transport aircraft serves the autoflight system, while the same class of unit on a light platform may feed only the crew display, so the consequence of a misleading position differs by aircraft and changes the integrity burden. The read keeps the failure-condition classification tied to the platform the unit serves.
Regulatory limits
Endeavor Elements supports the applicant's navigation-article data. It does not grant an authorization, make integrity findings for the authority, or warrant that a navigation function will be accepted. The applicant submits and the authority decides.
What this review does not cover
- Granting an article authorization or operational navigation approval
- Making compliance findings on the authority's behalf
- Conducting the navigation flight or ground testing itself
Specific to this review
- Integrity, the detection of a wrong position, is usually the binding constraint on a navigation article, harder to substantiate than accuracy and the place findings concentrate.
- Accuracy demonstrated only in benign conditions leaves the operational envelope unbounded, which is a recurring gap in navigation packages.
- The navigation function's failure condition is misleading output, so the software level often has to account for an undetected error rather than a simple loss.
Sources
U.S. Government (eCFR). Type certificates, STCs (Subpart E), TSO authorizations (Subpart O), PMA (Subpart K), and export airworthiness approvals (Subpart L).
RTCA. Objectives and lifecycle data for airborne software assurance, by design assurance level (DAL A-E).
SAE International. Safety assessment methods (FHA, PSSA, SSA, FTA, FMEA) supporting development assurance level assignment.
RTCA. Environmental qualification test categories and procedures referenced by TSO and equipment qualification.
Frequently asked questions
Why does the integrity case matter more than accuracy?
A small position error the crew can see is a different hazard than a wrong position the crew trusts. Integrity is the detection of the undetected error, and it is where navigation findings concentrate, so the read presses hardest there.
Relevant glossary terms
Related pages
Where this fits
Talk to an engineer who has done this work
We will walk through your current state, the records or evidence involved, and a scoped first engagement.
Walk through your situation with an engineer who has done this work.